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Book Reviews

THE CONCEPTUAL JURISPRUDENCE OF
THE GERMAN CONSTITUTION
A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. By
Robert Alexy/ trans., Julian Rivers? Oxford University
Press. 2002. Pp. liii + 462. $110.00.
William Ewald 3
This welcome work is a scrupulous translation of Robert
Alexy's Theorie der Grundrechte,4 a work which first appeared in
1986 and which has been one of the most influential recent contributions to European thinking about the adjudication of constitutional rights. 5 The English version contains a new Postscript
responding to the various criticisms the work has attracted in the
past two decades. The theme of the book is the individual rights
jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court. Of the major
European legal systems, Germany, with its "higher-law" Constitution, an expansive list of individual constitutional rights, and a
special court explicitly charged with their enforcement, has been
at the forefront of the development of a European human rights
jurisprudence. The European Convention on Human Rights, and
such national statutes as the British Human Rights Act 1998,
have begun to spread constitutional rights adjudication throughout the rest of Europe. The work of the German Constitutional
Court has provided one of the chief intellectual models, espeI. Professor of Public Law and Legal Philosophy, Christian Albrechts University,
Kiel, Germany.
2. Lecturer in Law, University of Bristol.
3. Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania.
4. ROBERT ALEXY, THEORJE DER GRUNDRECHTE (1986).
5. Recent discussions of Alexy's theory include KARL-EBERHARD HAIN, DIE GRUNDSATZE
DES GRUDGESETZES (1999), and MATllilAS JESTAEDT, GRUNDREOITSENlFALTUNG 1M GESETZ
(1999).
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cially for the new constitutions of Eastern Europe. For over fifty
years it has been generating constitutional opinions, often of exceptional quality, and has in the process developed the richest
body of constitutional case law outside of the United States; but
it is a body of case law with close affinities to continental European styles of adjudication.
It is tempting (and also, with reservations, correct) to describe the spread of human rights constitutionalism as an expansion of the "American model" of judicial review. Certainly the
post-war German Constitution was influenced heavily in its conception of judicial review (via Austria) by the American example; and the Constitutional Court has paid careful attention over
the years to the work of the United States Supreme Court. But it
is worthwhile to recall that the most vigorous period of American human rights adjudication did not begin in earnest until several years after the adoption of the German Basic Law, a document that already reads like a charter for the activism of the
Warren Court. In important respects the constitutional developments in the two countries have run in parallel, in the same
direction but independently of one another. But more importantly, as the bibliography and the discussions in this book make
clear, the intellectual roots of European constitutional rights discourse have roots that go back centuries into the western legal
tradition. The debates are rich and complex, the theoretical constructs highly sophisticated; so that what one sees in the wave of
new human rights courts is not a simple transplanting of American law, but a highly creative borrowing and re-thinking, from
many sources, of fundamental concepts that lie at the heart of
the western legal tradition, and of which American law is but
one outcropping. All of this means that there is an exceptional
interest for American constitutional scholars in following the developments in Europe: even when they converge on the same result, the process of reasoning is often different enough to be
theoretically illuminating.
Alexy's work provides a window onto an important corner
of these intellectual developments. It deals with, and criticizes, a
wide range of theories in German constitutional scholarship; if
one reads it with care, one can get an introduction to at least
some of the modern debates. But an immediate warning is in order. This is an important book, but it is by no means an easy
book, and the reader must be prepared to work and to think in
order to get at its meat. There are three reasons for this. First,
the book was originally written as a Habilitation thesis-that is,
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as the thesis for the second German doctoral degree (in effect,
the necessary credential for a tenured professorship). H abilitation theses, especially in law, tend to be long, heavily footnoted,
and, above all, comprehensive-designed rather to demonstrate
complete mastery of some doctrinal subject-area than originality.
Alexy is by disposition and training an analytical legal philosopher, and his work, especially in the core theoretical chapters, is
far more original than one typically finds in this scholarly genre.
But he was also constrained to follow the model, and his thesis
plunges deeply into constitutional doctrine and into the thicket
of learned commentary. This is a mixed blessing. The discussions
are informative for a reader trying to get a sense of the field as a
whole; but often Alexy will spend several paragraphs discussing
and then demolishing some theory that, objectively, was not
worth the trouble. Moreover, the primary audience was academic specialists in German constitutional law. Even in its original version it was not a book aimed at a general audience, or
even at typical law students, but rather at a hard core of experts.
It therefore takes for granted a knowledge of the principal decisions and of the procedures of the Constitutional Court, as well
as an extensive knowledge of the background scholarly debates.
For this reason, one must be prepared to read attentively: it is a
bit like overhearing one side of a faint conversation where one is
not always entirely sure what is being discussed. The points of
reference are subtly different, and one must try to fill in the gaps.
Fortunately, the core chapters where Alexy sets forth his own
theory of rules and principles are extremely lucid, and stand on
their own; but an American reader coming to this subject-matter
for the first time would find it helpful to begin with a survey exposition of German constitutional law-such as the excellent
treatises by Kommers 6 or Currie 7 - before tackling the more
doctrinal portions of Alexy's book.
A third difficulty should be mentioned. The translation, by
Julian Rivers, is exceptionally painstaking; and Rivers himself
provides an illuminating, lengthy introduction discussing of the
relevance of Alexy's theory to the British Constitution. Scholarly
translations of this quality are rare and difficult, requiring as
they do not only linguistic mastery, but a mastery of the ideas.
The job must have taken Rivers many months to complete, and
6. DONALD KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (2nd ed., 1997).
7. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY (1994).
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the care he took is evident on every page. But the reader should
be aware that the translation tends to the literal rather than to
the elegant. Clearly this was a conscious choice, and one can
have a high degree of confidence that Alexy's ideas are being accurately rendered. But there is not much music in the prose, and
often one must be prepared to re-formulate the English in order
to bring it closer into line with familiar terminology. (Rivers
gives an example of this process himself on p. xliv of his introduction giving his translation of Alexy's principles of equality,
and then, three pages later, re-casting them "in more familiar
language.") One is grateful for the accuracy of the translation,
but it comes at a price in readability; and, once again, the reader
will have to expend effort to get the full benefit of Alexy's arguments.
In other words, this is a challenging and difficult book,
densely argued and densely written: it is not for beginners, nor
for the faint of heart. But it is an important book, in many ways a
brilliant book, and it richly repays close study. The intellectual
project, the questions raised, the range of reference show a powerful legal mind at work on matters of fundamental importance.
Alexy's purpose is to provide a systematic theory of the individual rights provisions of the German Constitution. His concern is
thus limited to a single national constitution; he explicitly (p. 5)
disavows any intention here to provide a general theory of constitutional government, let alone a general theory of human
rights. His work is not intended as a contribution to history, or
sociology, or political theory, or even legal philosophyalthough it does contain long substantive contributions to legal
philosophy, and specifically to the theory of norms and principles. Rather, it is an attempt at a comprehensive, rational reconstruction of the constitutional law of human rights as it has been
articulated in the decisions of the German Constitutional Court.
But this is scarcely a narrow or simple enterprise, and perhaps the greatest merit of this book is that it makes clear just
what is involved in such a task, and how difficult it is of completion. Alexy does not aim at a mere catalogue of constitutional
case law: his demands on his theory are far more stringent, and
closely tied to his view of the role of legal scholarship. For if the
legal order in general, and the law of constitutional rights in particular, is not to be the arbitrary imposition of rules randomly
chosen by the judge and backed by the force of the state, then it
must be possible to give a rational, articulated account of how
this entire body of law is put together-of its scope, of its proc-
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esses of decision, of the unifying principles that hold it together-in such a way as to exhibit it as a rational construction,
deserving of the loyalty of the citizen. That is a tall order; and
Alexy is here concerned with only one portion of it, namely, the
enterprise of logical and conceptual analysis-of revealing
clearly just what this body of law amounts to, and how it is structured. This is not, for Alexy, the whole of constitutional theory,
but is its indispensable foundation: "Conceptual and analytical
clarity is an elementary prerequisite for the rationality of any
field of knowledge. In practical disciplines, which are only indirectly controlled by empirical experience, this requirement has
even greater significance" (p. 14).
It is important to observe that Alexy does not pursue logical
analysis for its own sake, and that the point of his investigations
is ultimately a moral one-that the legitimacy of the constitutional order depends on the possibility of just such a rigorous
and principled account, and that it is above all the duty of legal
scholarship to provide it: "If there is no clarity in the structure of
constitutional rights and constitutional rights norms, then there
will be no clarity in constitutional adjudication, either" (p. 15).
In particular:
Without a conceptual-systematic exposition of law, legal
scholarship is not possible as a rational enterprise. The measure of rationality of legal jurisprudence depends to a large extent on the standard it reaches in the analytical dimension ....
To the extent that the study of constitutional rights can distance itself at all from political rhetoric and the vacillating
battle of world-views, this is the work of the analytical dimension (p. 18).

In adopting this position, in advocating a turn towards rigorous conceptual analysis, Alexy is very much taking sides in the
long-standing debate between "formalists" and "anti-formalists"
in German legal theory. Roughly speaking, as in America, the
modern tendency has been to denigrate the approach of the
"mere formalists" of the nineteenth century. (This is of course
no coincidence, since Holmes, Pound, and Llewellyn were all influenced in particular by the anti-formalist arguments of nineteenth-century German legal scholarship, and in particular by
the works of Rudolf von Jhering.) Alexy consciously takes his
stand against the anti-formalists, and with the analytical tradition
represented by Gerber, Windscheid, Jellinek, Laband and Kelsen-a tradition which he seeks to marry to the work of modern
analytical moral philosophers like Rawls, Hart, Hare, Dworkin,
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and Raz. That such a marriage is now seen as natural and a rich
mine of jurisprudential ideas is in no small measure a consequence of Alexy's book; but in 1986 it was far from a commonplace. He quotes Wesley Hohfeld repeatedly and with relish on
the need for conceptual clarity in law, and skillfully deploys an
arsenal of technical tools (mostly coming from deontic logic) in
his quest for rigor. He also deploys a dry irony to devastating effect. After discussing the protests of the anti-formalists against
Jellinek's theory, he remarks, "These comments, which could be
increased ... , contain the most important headings of a general
critique of... Jellinek's status theory. It goes: formalism, abstraction, spatialization, isolated individual, obsolete. The counterparts are: reality, concrete, mediation, common life/society, current" (p. 175). Or again, he remarks:
The criticism of "spatial thought processes" seems to go further than mere formality. According to Rupp, "thinking in
spatial categories is the enemy of all legal academic attempts
to conceive of law as a social phenomenon." In the context of
our discussion of status theory, the idea of a sphere of freedom was explicitly included." A sphere of freedom is none
other than a class of specific liberties. So long as one understands the idea of a sphere of freedom in this sense, it is not
only harmless, it is indispensable. Relating to classes of objects is an unavoidable element of thought and speech (p.
177).

In a pregnant remark, Alexy describes his work as standing in
the tradition of "conceptual jurisprudence" (p. 18). The remark
was no doubt intended to startle (the American equivalent
would be to claim to be working in the formalist tradition of
Langdell), but it also provides a useful historical orientation.
Nineteenth century conceptual jurisprudence was in fact an extremely rich and sophisticated movement (far more so than
Langdellian legal science) which systematically re-thought and
re-organized the conceptual categories of Roman law, and
thereby provided the intellectual foundation for the German
Civil Code of 1900. It also, in the process, provided the basis for
a great deal of subsequent private-law theorizing, not only in
Germany and Austria, but also in France, Italy, and Latin America. The core accomplishment was the creation of the celebrated
(and controversial) "General Part" of the Civil Code, in which
the fundamental concepts of private law, at a high level of abstraction, are gathered together and placed in a systematic arrangement. Alexy's work can be viewed as an ambitious attempt
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to provide German constitutional law with its own "General
Part"; and it shows just what is required in such an enterprise,
and how difficult it is to carry through successfully. In the spirit
of conceptual jurisprudence, Alexy does not attempt directly to
recount and to analyze the individual decisions of the Constitutional Court, but rather to unpack the basic conceptual apparatus that underlies its work.
The core of Alexy's analysis is found in Chapter Three,
which is devoted to the structure of constitutional rights norms.
There he presents the arguments for his core thesis, namely, that
constitutional rights are principles, and that principles are "optimization requirements." His theory in important respects resembles (and was influenced by) Dworkin's theory in Taking
Rights Seriously. 8 Like Dworkin, he takes the distinction between rules and principles to be fundamental to constitutional
theory; like Dworkin, he gives principle-based reasoning priority
over rule-based; unlike Dworkin, his category of "principles"
embraces collective goals as well as individual rights. It is this
part of his theory-the theory of principles as optimization requirements-that has given rise to the most discussion and the
most controversy. Broadly speaking, the criticisms have come
from two directions. On the one hand, defenders of the traditional boundary between public law and private law have
charged that the "optimization requirements" would swallow up
private law, ultimately turning all of law into constitutional law;
on the other, defenders of individual rights have charged that the
"optimization requirements" do not place an adequate deontological fire wall around individual rights, but instead place them
on the same footing as collective goals.
Alexy's response to these criticisms is complex, and is contained in the new Postscript to the English edition. Very roughly,
his response to the first line of argument is that constitutional
principles, and in particular the principles of liberty and equality,
do in fact underlie the whole of the legal order, including the system of private law, so that in principle even questions of tort or
contract can turn into questions of constitutional law, provided
that they raise the issues of constitutional principle in a sufficiently acute form. However, in the great majority of cases the
constitutional principles do not themselves dictate any particular
answer to questions of private law, so that they leave open a
large field for legislative action. As for the second objection, his
8.

RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (rev. ed., 1978).
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reply (again very roughly) is that his theory allows one to make
rational judgments about the relative importance of one "optimization requirement" as compared to another, and also to
evaluate the degree of significance of an interference with the
requirement; so that, in this way, one can both allow for the
greater importance of individual rights over certain collective
goals, but without falling into the sort of ontological absolutism
that would never permit any balancing of, say, a relatively minor
infringement of freedom of travel against the interests of national security.
This theory of principles lies at the conceptual heart of
Alexy's theory. Having analyzed norms and rules, principles and
rights, and having argued for a complex model that will employ
both rules and principles and provide for a "soft ordering" of the
basic constitutional principles, he then, in the remaining half of
the book, proceeds to an analysis of legal status, the limits on individual rights, and the general rights to liberty and equality.
These topics are familiar territory for a classical constitutional
theory based on "defensive" rights against the state. Most of
German constitutional law fits this classical model; but in the
closing chapters Alexy considers the status of positive rights
against the state (in particular, the right to a minimum level of
social welfare), and also the difficult problem of horizontal or
third-party effects-that is, the problem of the extent to which
constitutional law affects the private-law obligations of citizens
to one another. The discussions are intricate, and the theory of
principles is the guiding thread throughout these complex discussions; the arguments are pursued with a great deal of acumen
and of attention to architectonic detail.
Despite all his respect for logic and intellectual precision,
Alexy is careful not to claim too much for his theory, and he
warns both against expecting too much and against expecting too
little. Those who expect too little include the "decisionists" and
the out-and-out sceptics who think that no objective ranking of
constitutional principles is possible, or that abstract theories are
incapable of offering guidance in concrete cases, or that judicial
decisions are always more or less irrational. Those who expect
too much want a legal theory that will provide a single, demonstrably right answer to every legal question (and, as is well
known, often the sceptics are just frustrated super-objectivists
who have lurched from the conclusion that a legal theory cannot
solve every problem to the despairing conclusion that it can
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solve none). Alexy steers a middle course between these extremes:
[A] substantive constitutional rights theory which necessarily
lays down the resolution of every constitutional rights case is
thus not possible. But this gives us a reason for not expecting
too much from a substantive constitutional rights theory from
the very beginning. One can expect no more from it than that
it rationally structure to the greatest extent possible constitutional rights argumentation in a substantively acceptable way.
These requirements are satisfied by a principled theory which
contains a bundle of constitutional rights principles, and
which places these in a soft ordering by granting prima facie
precedence to the principles of legal liberty and legal equality
(p. 386).

One comes away from this work, not so much persuaded by all
of the arguments, as impressed by the range of problems, the
subtlety of the distinctions, the range of scholarship, and especially by the sheer intellectual difficulty of constructing an architectonic constitutional theory that will satisfy Alexy's stringent
demands.

